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The Limits to Designed Orders:  
Authority under “Distributed Knowledge”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine the argument, put forward by modern management writers and, 
in a somewhat different guise by Austrian economists, that authority is not a 
viable mechanism of coordination in the presence of “distributed knowledge” 
(which corresponds to Hayek’s treatment of the use of dispersed knowledge 
in society).  We define authority and distributed knowledge and argue that 
authority is compatible with distributed knowledge. Moreover, it is not clear 
on theoretical grounds how distributed knowledge impacts on economic 
organization. An implication is that the Austrian argument that designed 
orders are strongly constrained by the Hayekian knowledge problem (Hayek, 
Kirzner, Sautet) is shaky. The positive flipside of this argument is that 
Austrians confront an exciting research agenda in theorizing how distributed 
knowledge impacts economic organization. 
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Introduction 
An important tenet of Austrian economics is that the “Hayekian knowledge problem,” 
that is, the problem of how to make best use of dispersed knowledge, is a strong 
constraint on designed orders.   While best known from its application in the socialist 
calculation debate (Lavoie 1985; Boettke 1989), the argument has been applied to 
“localized central planning” in the form of firm organization (Kirzner 1992: 161-162; 
Minkler 1993; Cowen and Parker 1997; Hodgson 1998; Foss 1999, 2001; Sautet 2000).  
Israel Kirzner (1992: 162) nicely encapsulates the basic argument: “We may expect firms 
spontaneously to expand to the point where additional advantages of ‘central’ planning 
are just offset by the incremental knowledge difficulties that stem from dispersed 
information.”  Also, an ongoing discussion in contemporary management studies on 
the limitations of authority as a mechanism of coordination under conditions of, what is 
usually referred to in this literature as “distributed knowledge” almost reads like a 
replay of the socialist calculation debate (notably Grandori 2002).   
 While the above economists apply the Hayekian argument quite abstractly (Sautet 
2000 is a partial exception), the management literature adds observation to the 
argument.  Thus, it is argued, and sometimes empirically substantiated, that firms 
increasingly rely on a growing number of knowledge specialists, be they employees or 
outside knowledge agents, such as supplier firms or universities (for evidence, 
Granstrand, Patel and Pavitt 1997; Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt 2001).  This implies that 
firm management will share less of the knowledge to which they somehow need to 
secure access.  Increasing inefficiency predictably arises.  In fact, some argue that 
authority is an inherently inefficient mechanism of coordination under distributed 
knowledge.  Grandori (2002: 257) concludes that “[d]istributed knowledge causes 
authority (as a centralized decision-making system) to fail in all its forms.”   The 
conclusion emerges from a two-step argument.  First, it is argued that authority ¾ that 
is, the right to make decisions which guide the decisions of another person (Coase 1937; 
Simon 1951, 1991; Coleman 1990) ¾ presupposes considerable knowledge about the 
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capabilities and action set that is available to those that are being directed.  Second, the 
presence of distributed knowledge means that this condition cannot be fulfilled.1     
 Because of its obvious affinity to the Hayekian position in the calculation debate 
(Hayek 1945), as well as its importance for the understanding of economic organization, 
this argument will be critically discussed in the following.  The strategy is, however, not 
to apply Austrian insights to the argument (which already may be seen as Austrian in 
spirit) per se.  Rather, we shall examine the argument in its own rights, and see what this 
may imply for Austrian economics.2    
 The design of the paper is as follows.  We begin by taking a closer look at the 
notion of distributed knowledge, which is seldom if ever defined with much precision. 
We put forward a definition. Authority is then considered in the context of distributed 
knowledge, which leads to taking issue with the argument, put forward by some 
management writers as well as Austrian and Austrian-influenced economists, that 
authority is necessarily an inefficient mechanism of coordination when knowledge is 
distributed.  We then discuss the complicated link between distributed knowledge and 
the boundaries of the firm. Implications for Austrian economics are drawn.  
Fundamentally, we conclude that at the present stage of knowledge, the Austrian 
argument that designed orders are strongly constraind by the Hayekian knowledge 
problem needs to be clarified and strengthened.  The positive flipside of this argument 
is that Austrians confront an exciting research agenda in theorizing how distributed 
knowledge impacts economic organization. 
 
 Distributed Knowledge  
During the last decade the notion of distributed knowledge has been used with 
increasing frequence as an apt description of the knowledge conditions in which 
                                                 
1 A further argument then suggests that alternative coordination mechanisms (Grandori 2001) will 
substitute for authority to meet the need for coordination that still exists under distributed knowledge. 
2  Foss (2001) also argued that authority may co-exist with Hayekian distributed knowledge, but did not 
draw implications for Austrian economics of this argument.  Also, Foss (2001) is less specific about the 
notion of distributed knowledge than the present paper.  
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modern firms, the argument goes, increasingly find themselves.3  From an (Austrian) 
economics perspective, Cowen and Parker (1997), Foss (1999) and Sautet (2000) 
explicitly introduced Hayekian reasoning in order to pinpoint the management 
dilemmas introduced by dispersed knowledge.  Introducing Austrian considerations 
into agency theory, Minkler (1993) argued that distributed knowledge makes authority 
break down.  In the firm strategy field, Tsoukas (1996) conceptualized the firm as a 
distributed knowledge system (explicitly referring to Hayek 1945). In technology 
studies, Granstrand, Patel and Pavitt (1997) documented the increasing extent to which 
the knowledge bases controlled by major technology-intensive corporations are 
distributed.  Many other references can be found (see Foss and Foss 2003).   
 Apparently, the notion rings a bell in a number of diverse contexts. But what does 
it mean to say that knowledge is distributed?  Unfortunately, the above contributions 
are not entirely forthcoming with respect to precise definitions of this concept.  The 
same critique may actually be directed against the Austrian literature.  While 
suggestive, the famous passages from Hayek (1945) hardly qualify as definitions of the 
notion of distributed knowledge.  Moreover, it is not clear whether Austrian dispersed 
knowledge is identical to distributed knolwedge.  The following makes an attempt to go 
somewhat further in the direction of definition.  
Towards a Definition of Distributed (Dispersed) Knowledge 
 Distributed knowledge is a member of a set of concepts that relate to the different 
ways in which knowledge may “belong” to a group of agents.  Two other examples of 
this kind of concepts are the game theory notion of “common knowledge” and “shared 
knowledge.” An event is common knowledge among a group of players if each player 
knows it, each one knows that the other players know it, each player knows that other 
players know that the other players know it and so on (Aumann 1976).4  Shared 
knowledge differs from common knowledge by not requiring that each agent knows 
that the other agents know, etc.  Thus, there is shared knowledge of a fact if each agent 
                                                 
3  To our knowledge, the term originates with Halpern and Moses (1990).   
4 Common knowledge is a core assumption in much of contemporary game theory based 
microeconomics, such as agency theory (Salanié 1997). 
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knows this fact, but does not know that the other agents know it.    
 If common knowledge lies at one end of the spectrum, distributed knowledge lies 
at the other end.  Loosely, knowledge is distributed when a set of agents knows 
something no single agent (completely) knows. Thus, the notions that firms (Tsoukas 
1996) or whole economies (Hayek 1945, 1973) are distributed knowledge systems mean 
that the set of agents comprising these entities collectively possesses knowledge that no 
single agent possesses.  In this sense, distributed knowledge has the same 
characteristics as dispersed “knowledge in society” as discussed by Hayek (1945).   
Note that this does not amount to asserting the existence of mysterious supra-
individual “collective minds.” Knowledge still ultimately resides in the heads of 
individuals; however, when this knowledge is combined and “aggregated” in certain 
ways, it means that considered as a system, a set of agents possesses knowledge that 
they do not possess if separated.  On the basis of epistemic logic (Hintikka 1962) 
distributed knowledge may be defined as follows:   
Definition ¾ Distributed Knowledge: If Kipi means that agent i knows proposition i, 
a set of n agents has distributed knowledge of a proposition q (i.e., Dq) when: K1p1 Ù  K2p2 
Ù  … Ù  Knpn Þ Dq,  q ¹ pi, "i.5    
For example, Jack knows that p is the case and Jill knows that p implies y, but neither 
know that y is the case.  However, if Jack and Jill’s information states are “added” there 
is a sense, which is more than metaphorical, in which they may know that y is the case 
(Gerbrandy 1998: 53). The information that y is the case is present in the system 
comprising Jack and Jill, but in a distributed form.   
 The above definition is open to some interpretation.   At one extreme, Jack and Jill 
may both be completely ignorant about the knowledge controlled by the other party.  
Sometimes such an interpretation is made of the “competitive equilibrium” model in 
                                                 
5  pi could be interpreted as a vector of propositions.  Thus, we are not asserting that each agent only 
knows one thing.  Also note that this definition does not distinguish between the situation where 
knowledge is not presently held by a single agent because of costs of communication and information 
processing, and knowledge that could not possibly be possessed by a single agent (the situation that 
Austrians usually identify with the Hayekian knowledge problem, e.g., Lavoie 1945).  As Boettke (1989) 
points out, mechanism design solutions are irrelevant for the latter kind of problem.  
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economics: Although knowledge of technologies and preferences is private, all this 
knowledge is utilized in the best possible way, so that the knowledge of how to bring 
about an allocation of resources with superior welfare properties is distributed in the 
economy.  At the other extreme, there is considerable, but not complete,6 knowledge 
overlap (p i may be close in some sense to pj), but it is still the case that no single agent 
knows q.  Between the extremes are different degrees of overlap between individual 
knowledge elements.   
Distributed Knowledge as a Challenge to Authority 
Simon on Authority   
 It is well known that authority is one of the most complicated and hard to pin 
down notions in social science.  Different notions abound, and it is not clear how these 
notions relate or even if they have shared components (compare Weber 1947; Simon 
1951; Thompson 1956; Coleman 1990; Grandori 2001 among the clear discussions).  In 
order to meaningfully discuss authority, one has to make an explicit choice among the 
many notions.   For the purpose of this paper, the concept of authority offered by 
Herbert Simon (1951) serves as useful starting points.  Also, Simon’s paper is still the 
canonical economics treatment of authority, in spite of it being more than five decades 
old.   
 Simon (1951) defines authority as obtaining when a “boss” is permitted by a 
“worker” to select actions, A0 Ì A, where A is the set of the worker’s possible behaviors.  
More or less authority is then defined as making the set A0 larger or smaller.7   Thus, to 
Simon (1951) authority is a right to decide that an employer acquires, because he 
                                                 
6 If knowledge overlap is complete, the agents will also know or be able to infer q (if they have perfect 
rationality/perfect reasoning assumptions and/or the knowledge elements and how they connect is easy 
to comprehend).   
7 Simon’s definition is a stepping-stone to his model of the employment relationship.   This is a multi-
stages game in the context of an incomplete contract with ex post governance where, in the first period, 
the prospective worker decides whether to accept employment or not.  In this period, none of the parties 
know which actions will be optimal, given circumstances.  In the next period, the relevant circumstances 
as well as the costs and benefits associated with the various possible tasks are revealed to the boss.  The 
boss then directs the worker to a task, which ¾ for the latter to accept the assignment ¾ must lie within 
his or her “zone of acceptance.” 
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expects to obtain only ex post contracting the relevant information that will make 
possible the picking of efficient actions, which he will then direct the employee to carry 
out.  This notion is based on the employer picking well-defined actions from a set of 
discrete actions (about which the employer has perfect information).  He does this on 
the basis of knowledge that is superior to that of the employee (Foss 1999).8   
Authority and the Hayekian Knowledge Problem 
 The first systematic argument that distributed knowledge represents a challenge 
to central planning and direction was developed by Hayek (1935, 1945) in the specific 
context of the interwar debate on the economic efficiency of socialism (see Lavoie 1985).  
In these early works, Hayek does not directly criticize the use of authority as a 
mechanism of coordination; rather, his critical target is the notion that benevolent 
planners can draft complete contingent plans for the allocation of resources on a societal 
level, based on all relevant knowledge being concentrated in the hands of a central 
planner.  Still, it is easy to see that Hayek’s argument represents a challenge to authority 
in the sense of Simon and Coase.  Indeed, as he notes, it is only in the “… most simple 
kind of organization [that] it is conceivable that all the details of all activities are 
governed by a single mind” (Hayek 1973: 49).   
 Therefore, all larger or more complex firms confronts a “… problem which any 
attempt to bring order into complex human activities meets: the organizer must wish 
the individuals who are to cooperate to make use of knowledge that he himself does not 
possess” (Hayek 1973: 49).  This means that “… every organization must rely also on 
rules and not only on specific commands.  The reason here is the same as that which 
makes it necessary for a spontaneous order to rely solely on rules: namely that by 
guiding the actions of individuals by rules rather than specific commands it is possible 
to make use of knowledge which nobody possesses as a whole” (1973: 48-49).  Such 
                                                 
8 Simon’s explanation is quite akin to Coase’s (1937).  In the presence of uncertainty, Coase argues, 
contingencies are costly to anticipate and describe in advance, and rather than negotiating on a spot 
market basis over each contingency as they arise, an employment contract is concluded.  The latter is 
defined as “… one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating) 
agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits.  The essence of the contract is that it 
should only state the limits to the powers of the entrepreneur.  Within these limits, he can therefore direct 
the other factors of production” (idem.: 242).   
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rules are “rules for the performance of assigned tasks.”   They are therefore “necessarily 
subsidiary to commands” (1973: 49).    
 Notice that Hayek here points to a broader understanding of authority (than the 
Simon 1951 understanding),9 one that, he argues, is consistent with distributed 
knowledge.  Thus, Hayek does not deny that in practice the problem of making use of 
distributed knowledge can be solved by firms, and that authority, the central characteristic 
of firm organization, is consistent with distributed knowledge.  However, observe also 
that Hayek does not explain how the problem is solved: If knowledge inside the firm is 
indeed distributed, how can management choose good “rules for the performance of 
assigned tasks”? How are employees assigned to tasks and how are standards for 
performance chosen when these actions are partially dependent on knowledge that 
management does not hold itself?   
The (Alleged) Breakdown of Authority in the Face of Distributed Knowledge  
 In contrast to Hayek, some modern writers in management as well as in 
economics deny that authority is a viable mechanism of coordination under distributed 
knowledge conditions.   Thus, Grandori (1997: 35) argues that  
… whatever its basis, authority is a feasible governance mechanism only if 
information and competence relevant to solving economic action problems 
can be transferred to and handled by a single actor, a positive “zone of 
acceptance” exists, the actions of other supervised actors are observable, and 
if the system is not as large as to incur an overwhelming communication 
channel overload and control losses. 
According to this argument, distributed knowledge challenges authority because it 
implies that all “information and competence” relevant to solving a problem cannot be 
given to a single decision-maker, actions are not generally observable, and there may be 
substantial “communication channel overload and control losses.  These are all 
                                                 
9  Note that Simon was quite aware of the narrowness of his 1951 notion of authority.  As he (1991: 31) 
pointed out four decades after his 1951 paper on authority that “[a]uthority in organizations is not used 
exclusively, or even mainly, to command specific actions.”  Instead, he explained it is a command that 
takes the form of a result to be produced, a principle to be applied, or goal constraints, so that “[o]nly the 
end goal has been supplied by the command, and not the method of reaching it.” 
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problems highlighted by Hayek in the context of the socialist calculation debate; in 
particular, the argument would seem to imply that using authority under conditions of 
distributed knowledge is based of the “synoptic delusion” that all relevant knowledge 
can be concentrated with a central decision maker.  
 To be more specific, we interpret the argument as follows.  The challenge to 
authority as a “feasible governance mechanism” arises for three reasons: Under 
distributed knowledge, 1) the employer does not possess full knowledge of the 
employee’s action set (i.e., the actions that he can take when uncertainty is resolved), so 
that the employee can take actions about which the manager has no knowledge; 2) the 
employee is better informed than the employer with respect to how certain actions 
should (optimally) be carried out; and 3) the employer does not know which actions 
should optimally be chosen from the action set in response to contingencies (because he 
lacks information on contingencies). Conclusion: The sheer ignorance on the part of 
directing employers implied by 1) to 3) means that authority cannot be an efficient 
mechanism of coordination.  Situations will arise where authority will result in the 
employer making the employee choose inefficient actions. Efficiency can be restored if 
the strict authority relationship is dis-solved, namely by delegating decision rights to 
the employee (Jensen and Meckling 1992), organize the firm as a partnership (Minkler 
1993), or even spinning him off as a separate firm.     
Authority and Distributed Knowledge   
 “Narrow authority” is the view of authority associated with Simon (1951).   The 
argument that has just been summarized holds that authority is fundamentally 
compromised by distributed knowledge. However, it is not always the case that 
suppressing distributed knowledge is inefficient.   For example, Hammond and Miller 
(1985: 1) argue that “… knowledge about any particular problem is seldom complete, 
and in a competitive or changing environment there may be advantages to making some 
decision, however imperfectly grounded on expertise, rather than none at all … In the 
absence of expert knowledge some chief executive is given authority to impose his own 
best judgment on the matter.”  It is not entirely transparent what Hammond and Miller 
mean here, but a later treatment by Bolton and Farrell (1990) provides a clue.  
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 Bolton and Farrell wish to identify the determinants of 
centralization/decentralization decisions.  In order to isolate the costs and benefits of 
centralized and decentralized decision-making in a specific setting, they study a 
coordination problem with private information in the setting of a natural monopoly 
market.  The coordination problem concerns which firm should enter the market when 
costs are sunk and are private information.  Under decentralization, which is represented 
as a two-period incomplete information game of timing (sink costs/enter or wait another 
period), each firm is uncertain about whether the other firm will enter.  However, the 
incentive to enter depends on the height of a given firm’s cost, low-cost firms being less 
worried that their rival will enter (and vice versa).  If costs are sufficiently dispersed, the 
optimal outcome prevails, that is, the lowest-cost producer enters and preempts the 
rival(s).  However, if costs are equal or are high for both, inefficiencies may obtain, since 
firms will then enter simultaneously (inefficient duplication) or will wait (inefficient 
delay).   Enter a central authority whose job is to nominate a firm for entry.  In the spirit of 
Hayek, Bolton and Farrell assume that this central authority cannot possess knowledge 
about costs.  In their model, s/he nominates the high cost producer half of the times, 
which is clearly inefficient.  However, this cost of centralization should be compared 
against the costs of decentralization (delay and duplication).  Bolton and Farrell show that 
“… the less important the private information that the planner lacks and the more 
essential coordination is, the more attractive the central planning solution is” (1990: 805).  
Moreover, the decentralized solution performs poorly if urgency is important.  
Centralization is assumed to not involve delay and therefore is a good mechanism for 
dealing with emergencies, a conclusion they argue is consistent with the observed 
tendencies of firms to rely on centralized authority in cases of emergencies. 
 While Austrians may argue that the Bolton and Farrell set up trivializes 
distributed knowledge, and exaggerates the benefits of centralization (e.g., it is assumed 
to not involve delays), their model does provide a rationale for authority under 
distributed knowledge, given their assumptions.  Even the narrow understanding of 
authority in Coase (1937) and Simon (1951) may be rendered consistent with distributed 
knowledge using the Bolton and Farrell argument: Although the employer may be 
ignorant of the efficient action, and perhaps of most of the employee action, he knows a 
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subset of the employee’s action set, so he can always tell him to “do something!”, which 
in certain situations may be preferable to doing nothing.  
 The example suggests the more general implication that some overlap of 
knowledge may be sufficient to make coordination by means of authority work in the 
presence of distributed knowledge.10   In particular, note it is not in conflict with the 
notion of distributed knowledge (at least as defined earlier) that some agent possesses 
the knowledge that ¾ in terms of the earlier example ¾ if Jack and Jill’s knowledge sets 
are somehow aggregated, this will result in their having, as a “system,” a knowledge 
that none of them possesses individually.  This agent does not need to know that Jack 
knows that p is the case and Jill knows that p implies y.  However, she does need to 
know that there is a set P of which p is a member and that these elements map to certain 
outcomes, Y, of which y is a member.  Thus, she may still be ignorant in an important 
sense about the knowledge controlled by Jack and Jill, she does not suffer from 
complete ignorance11; there is some, possibly rather modest, knowledge overlap.  She 
may therefore be able to pass judgment on the overall abilities of Jack and Jill, and, in 
particular, about how actions based on Jack and Jill’s knowledge may be coordinated.   
In other words, it is possible to have knowledge of interdependencies between actions 
based on different knowledge elements without possessing much knowledge of these 
elements themselves.   
 Frank Knight (1921) understood very clearly that the effective exercise of authority 
does not require full knowledge of an employee’s action set and precise knowledge of 
exactly which action should be picked in response to contingencies: “What we call 
‘control’ consists mainly of selecting someone else to do the ‘controlling.’  Business 
judgment is chiefly judgment of men.  We know things by knowledge of men who 
                                                 
10  Hayek (1945: 86) notes that even in the case of coordination by means of the price system knowledge 
overlap is necessary:“The whole acts as one market, not because any of its members survey the whole 
field, but because their limited fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through many intermediaries 
the relevant information is communicated to all.”    
11 On the other hand, it may not be entirely correct to say that she is “asymmetrically informed.”  In 
asymmetric information models, such as agency models, an agent knows precisely what she is ignorant 
about (e.g., the probability distribution associated with quality levels of a good). No such strong 
knowledge requirements are assumed here; only that the coordinator can pass judgment on the capacities 
of individual agents and on how their efforts may be aggregated into some coherent outcome.   
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know them and control things in the same indirect way” (Knight 1921: 291).12  These 
principles also apply to hierarchical organization which Knights conceptualizes as 
layers of agents exercising judgment of subordinates’ judgment and other capabilities 
(particularly 1921: 291-297).  Delegation, Knight argues, rests on judgment.  Such 
judgment does not require that that the principal knows the agent’s entire action set.13   
Thus, when Hayek (1973) argues that authority in the sense of the delegation of 
decision rights, the imposition of rules on the organization, the checking of whether 
actions are in conformity with the rules, etc. is consistent with distributed knowledge 
conditions, this can be defended by invoking management judgment of subordinates.   
Distributed Knowledge and the Size of Firms 
  So far it has been argued that delegation combined with judgment is what makes it 
possible for authority relations to exist under distributed knowledge conditions.  
Although managers/employers may not know the full action set of an employee or 
what is the efficient action to take in response to a contingency, applying judgment 
makes it possible to delegate responsibility to employees, specifying the end goal and 
possible constraints, rules, etc., but leaving the rest to the employee.  This is no different 
from how most agents interact with specialized other agents in the market place: Most 
of us non-plumbers usually don’t know the full action set of the plumber, or what 
exactly to do in response to some calamity involving the plumbing of our house.  Still, 
we rely on our judgment of the plumber, possibly supplemented with reputational 
mechanisms. Market transactions do not break down when there is only partial 
knowledge overlap.  Similarly, hierarchical mechanisms, involving authority, do not 
break down when there is only partial knowledge overlap.  Exchange is possible in the 
face of (partial) ignorance.   
  However, this reasoning immediately raises a problem that parallels the Coasian 
                                                 
12 Relatedly, Minkler (1993: 18) in parts of his modeling efforts assumes that the “… entrepreneur can 
form a conjecture about the worker’s possible output without contemplating how that output can be 
produced.”   
13  In the incomplete contracts/property rights approach of Oliver Hart (1995), it is assumed that agents in 
a cooperative relation may be able to foresee (at least probabilistically) the pay-offs from their relation, 
although they cannot perfectly foresee all sources of these pay-offs (i.e., contracts are incomplete).  This 
assumption is not defended in this approach, but may be justified by invoking Knightian judgment.  
 13
(Coase 1937) problem of why all economic activity is not concentrated in one giant firm 
when there are “costs of using the price mechanism”: Why exactly should judgment 
become increasingly ineffective as firm size increased? Kaldor (1934) argue that the 
“entrepreneur” is the fixed, limiting factor: Firm size will be constrained by the amount 
of judgment that could be derived from this factor (see also Rothbard 1962: Chapter 7).   
This argument neglects delegation.  Coase (1937) argues that as firm size grows, 
”dissimilarity of transactions” increases, and this is one reason why management 
commits an increasing number of mistakes as firms grow, the costs of these mistakes 
eventually offsetting the benefits from growth on the margin.  Coase does not expand on 
the meaning of “dissimilarity” and why increased dissimilarity leads to more errors.  
Kirzner (1992: 162) mention “the incremental knowledge difficulties that stem from 
dispersed information.”  However, it is not clear why these problems cannot all be 
remedied by means of delegation, supported by judgment.   
 A rudimentary hypothesis that may be invoked in support of such arguments is that 
as knowledge elements become increasingly heterogeneous, the informational basis for 
the exercise of authority becomes increasingly undermined; Coase (1937) directly appeals 
to something like this, and it may underlie Kirzner’s (1992) reasoning.  Thus, firms will 
draw their boundaries around capabilities that are “similar” in the terminology of 
Richardson (1972).  Much of contemporary management thinking on “core competencies,” 
“capabilities,” etc. and how these influence economic organization seem to reflect similar 
concerns (Langlois and Foss 1999).  Thus, concentration on core competencies lead firms to 
divest businesses, narrowing their product portfolios.  
However, a number of recent studies indicate that at the same time that major multi-
product firms have narrowed their product portfolios, they have actually increased their 
underlying technology portfolios (e.g., Granstrand, Patel and Pavitt 1997) and the 
technological disciplines that constitute these portfolios have become more heterogeneous 
(Wang and Tunzelman 2000).  Relatedly, Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt (2001) argue that 
firms need to control knowledge in excess of what they strictly need for their productive 
operations.  This is because such excess knowledge helps to cope with imbalances caused 
by uneven development in the technologies they rely on and with unpredictable 
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interdependencies on the level of products.  Thus, at least major multi-technology firms 
seem to control more and increasingly distributed knowledge within their boundaries, and 
subject to the use of the authority mechanism.  Thus, it is far from clear how, if at all, 
distributed knowledge constrains the boundaries and size of the firm.    
Implications for Austrian Economics 
Limits to Planned Orders?  
 The basic point that his been argued in the preceding pages is that authority relations 
are not necessarily compromised by conditions of distributed knowledge.  Assuredly, the 
narrrow version of authority associated with Simon (1951) does not thrive in the presence 
of distributed knowledge.  However, there is no inherent reason to take such a narrow 
view of authority.   Authority involves much more than merely picking an action in an 
employee’s action set and ordering him to carry out this action.   In the context of a 
broader notion of authority, the employer/manager may be ignorant, perhaps quite so, of 
knowledge controlled by employees, but it may still be possible to have him direct 
employees in various ways, such as instructing them to follow certain rules, meet certain 
objectives, etc. Somehow this has to be accomplised. And it is conceivable that 
coordination of plans by means of the exercise of authority is superior to any other 
coordination mechanism. 14   
 While it is indeed a central tenet of Austrian economics that exchange may take place 
in the face of ignorance, allowing this principle to bear on hierarchical transactions has 
potentially subversive implications for Austrian economics because it may be interpreted 
as a denial of the tenet that the dispersed/distributed character of knowledge constrains 
authority.  Problems introduced by distributed knowledge can be overcome by means of 
delegation and judgment.  Thus, it may not matter (or matter much) for allocative 
outcomes if a manager does not know how exactly an agent produces an output, but can 
pass precise judgment on the levels and quality of that output.   The right to choose the 
                                                 
14 One may speculate that communication, voting, and similar mechanisms may coordinate actions under 
distributed knowledge.  However, these mechanisms may be cumbersome relative to the authority 
mechanism. 
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means to produce this output may be delegated to the agent, possibly backed up by some 
incentive mechanism that mitigates the attendant moral hazard problem (Jensen and 
Meckling 1992).   If this is the case, it is hard to see how distributed knowledge constrains 
planned orders.   Empirically, it is at least not obvious that this is the case of those planned 
orders we call firms.  Clearly, the argument may be extended so that what is called into 
question is the whole Hayekian argument against socialism.   
An Austrian Research Agenda: Opening the Black Box of Knowledge Problems 
 It seems to us that to actually extend the argument in this way would be absurd.  We 
think that the Hayekian knowledge argument makes perfect intuitive sense; a socialist 
planning center cannot make use of distributed knowledge as effectively as the market 
system can.  However, our point is theoretical.  We put it in this pointed way to emphasize 
that the foundations of the Hayekian argument that dispersed/distributed knowledge 
strongly constrains planned orders are not rock-solid. 
 For example, in the revival of the 1980s of the Austrian arguments in the calculation 
debate much emphasis was placed on tacit knowledge (Lavoie 1985), which is often 
argued to be particularly costly to centralize (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1992).  But as the 
above reasoning implies, tacit knowledge per se does not require either market 
organization or perfect centralization for it effective utilization.  As Knight (1921) 
observed, firm hierarchies may make use of tacit knowledge. The quality of managerial 
judgment involves tacit knowledge (Hodgson 1998: 191-192), and judgment is used to 
determine delegation of decision rights in organization so that tacit knowledge held by 
employees is utilized in the best possible way.  In other words, the allocation of tacit 
knowledge requires tacit knowledge.15  One may speculate that what ultimately constrains 
planned orders is how well this process is carried out; thus, the ultimate constraint is the 
managerial judgment of the top-management team.  In a sense, we come back to Kaldor’s 
(1934) point that the ultimate constraint on firm size is the entrepreneurial fixed factor. 
Still, this leaves us in the dark about what are the limits to allocation of tacit knowledge (in 
the form of delegation) through managerial judgment.     
                                                 
15 This Knightian idea is the key point in some fascinating, but unduly neglected work by Pavel Pelikan 
(1988). 
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 As this line of reasoning indicates, Austrians need to open up the black box of 
knowledge problems in order to support their key tenet that such problems underlie the 
limits to planned orders.16  In their present manifestation, these arguments may not be 
sufficiently worked out to fully convince.  They are too much like “reduced form” 
arguments.17  Specifically, Austrians should look into issues such as, How exactly does 
increased ignorance on the part of employers/principals influence the quality of the 
decisions they make? Exactly what do we mean, in an economic context, by more or less 
ignorance?  Which factors limit the efficacy of managerial judgment?  Heterogeneity of the 
relevant knowledge inputs (e.g., delegating decision-making rights to employees with 
widely different disciplinary backgrounds)?  If so, what does it mean that knowledge is 
more or less “heterogeneous”? Etc.18    
 By making the recommendation to look more closely into such epistemic matters, we 
are in good company: Almost seventy years ago, Hayek (1937) sketched a research 
program for inquiring into the knowledge and process aspects of decision-making.  Only 
small fractions of such a program have been addressed by Hayek himself as well as later 
Austrians.  It is time to re-open the research agenda that he sketched in 1937.   
Conclusions 
The notion of distributed knowledge has become a prominent concept for describing the 
knowledge conditions in which modern firms (allegedly) more and more often find 
themselves.  Many writers have argued that these knowledge conditions imply that 
authority is becoming increasingly inefficient as a mechanism of coordination, an 
argument that served as a critical starting point for our discussion.   Similar arguments 
                                                 
16 That is, unless they want to drop the argument and instead invoke either incentive considerations (e.g., 
Williamson 1985: chapter 6) or Misesian calculation problems (as in Klein 1996). 
17  A related critique of working with reduced form arguments may be directed against the “control loss”-
literature of the 1960s (e.g., Williamson 1970) that also invoked “knowledge difficulties,” although these 
were usually explained in terms of information overload rather than dispersed knowledge. 
18 Austrians may also wish to develop a complementary argument, namely that the calculation problem 
identified by Mises, to the extent that it is distinct from Hayek's knowledge problem, may be useful in 
explaining the limits to the firm.  For a contribution along these lines, see Klein (1996) (building on 
Rothbard 1962). 
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have also been put forward by Austrian economists.  In a broader context, Austrians argue 
that distributed knowledge is a binding constraint on planned orders.  
 In this paper, we have discussed and rejected the more specific argument that 
coordination by means of authority is not viable under conditions of distributed 
knowledge.  While it is true that authority in the narrow sense put forward by Simon 
(1951), that is, the picking by an employer of efficient actions from an employee’s action 
set, does not make much sense when knowledge distributed and the employer is therefore 
likely to be ignorant about the employee’s action set, more expansive and realistic notions 
of authority is consistent with distributed knowledge and employer ignorance.  To 
paraphrase a famous argument from Alchian and Demsetz (1972), there is no essential 
difference in terms of knowledge requirements between hiring a plumber in the market 
place and ordering the plumber-employee to fix something.  We have suggested that 
driven to its logical extreme, this argument seems to threathen the Hayekian knowledge 
argument against socialism.  Rather than drawing this conclusion, we have advocated 
renewed Austrian interest into problems of distributed knowledge.     
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